Abstract-Distributed wireless mesh network technology is ready for public deployment in the near future. However, without an incentive system, one should not assume that private self-interested wireless nodes would participate in such a public network and cooperate in the packet forwarding service. This paper studies the use of pricing as an incentive mechanism for stimulating participation and collaboration in public wireless mesh networks. Our focus is on the "economic behavior" of the network nodes-the pricing and purchasing strategies of the access point, wireless relaying nodes, and clients. We use a "game-theoretic approach" to analyze their interactions from one-hop to multihop networks and when the network has an unlimited or limited channel capacity. The important results that we show are that the access point and relaying wireless nodes will adopt a simple yet optimal fixed-rate pricing strategy in a multihop network with an unlimited capacity. However, the access price grows quickly with the hop distance between a client and the access point, which may limit the "scalability" of the wireless mesh network. In case where the network has limited capacity, the optimal strategy for the access point is to vary the access charge and even interrupt service to connecting clients. To this end, we focus on the access point adopting a non-self-enforcing but more practical "fixed-rate noninterrupted service" model and propose an algorithm based on the Markovian decision theory to devise the optimal pricing strategy. Results show that the scalability of a network with limited capacity is upper bounded by one with an unlimited capacity. We believe that this work will shed light on the deployment and pricing issues of distributed public wireless mesh networks.
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INTRODUCTION
I N recent years, we have seen a growing interest in wireless mesh network technology and, simultaneously, the growing popularity of wireless network devices at homes, offices, and public places such as cafés, malls, and hotels. The two induce a vision that, when the wireless mesh network technology is deployed to the public, we would have nearly ubiquitous wireless coverage in large urban areas, provided that a vast number of private wireless access points and devices participate in such a mesh network. Another justification for using the mesh technology is to bring Internet access to developing areas, where wired network infrastructure is not readily available.
However, an important question that is left unanswered is why private access points and wireless nodes would participate in a public mesh network and act in a cooperative manner. Connectivity in a mesh network relies on nodes forwarding packets for each other, but relaying packets incurs costs to a node in terms of reduced bandwidth, energy consumption, potential security risks, and so forth. In community, experimental, or proprietary mesh networks, cooperation can be assumed, but, in order that a wireless mesh network may go beyond community borders and provide ubiquitous wireless coverage to the general public, we have to take note that nodes in the network will be private, self-interested, or economically rational. Without incentives, one should not assume these nodes to cooperate.
In this work, we study the use of pricing as a mechanism for stimulating participation and collaboration in a public mesh network. As the objective of most nodes would be to access the Internet, we take "Internet access" as a service and, hence, access points are the service sellers. Any downstream wireless nodes may purchase this service for her own consumption or for reselling it to nodes further downstream. Transactions involved must be on a per-access basis by using technology such as the PayWord micropayment scheme [1] , [2] , which minimizes the transaction overhead. A monthly prepayment scheme (such as those implemented in proprietary wireless mesh access networks) or the like is impossible as nodes concerned here are not reliable enough to provide consistent service in the long run. By this access provision business, participating nodes generate revenue to compensate for their costs for packet forwarding. We investigate the pricing and purchasing behavior of different nodes in the network. We seek to answer these questions:
. How will the access point and different wireless relaying nodes set their prices for the service? . Will their optimal pricing schemes be complicated, such as the access point charging a floating rate with time, which may discourage clients for the service? . How many clients can afford the price and eventually receive the Internet service?
. Do we need third-party supervision to enforce the price? . Is it economically scalable to extend the network in a multihop fashion? Will the price charged to a distant client be too high after the relaying nodes add in their costs and desired gains? We believe that answers to these questions will shed light on the deployment of public wireless mesh networks.
Our analysis adopts a game-theoretic approach to find out the strategies that the access points, relaying wireless nodes, and clients will play throughout the bargaining process in equilibrium. We focus on mesh networks in which there is a single access point having the Internet connectivity and every wireless client has a single path toward this access point. Fig. 1 shows three examples of such a tree-like network. We differentiate two cases in this setting: 1) The wireless network and the access point's wired uplink to the Internet have an unlimited capacity (or the capacity is sufficiently large to satisfy all demands) and 2) the network has a limited capacity. In each case, we first look at a one-hop network, as depicted in Fig. 1a , in which all clients can reach the access point directly. Then, we extend it to the multihop case, as in Fig. 1c , in which clients have to route through numerous relaying wireless nodes, or resellers, to the access point in order to receive the Internet access service. Note that the one-hop case and two-hop case (Fig. 1b) under the unlimited capacity assumption are first studied in the seminal in [3] . Studying pricing under the unlimited capacity assumption is worthwhile as it provides asymptotic results as the wired and wireless network capacity become abundant, which can be foreseen due to technology maturity. The limited capacity model offers a more realistic investigation and we expect the access point to play a rather different strategy when it can only sell its service to a limited number of clients. Adopting a tree-like network model simplifies the problem and provides us with the basic pricing structure in wireless mesh networks. As will be discussed later, results in tree-like networks will serve as building blocks for the pricing structure in networks with a general topology.
The contributions of this work are summarized as follows: First, we generalize the model in [3] and show that it is only a special case when the network has an unlimited capacity or, equivalently, has an adequate supply of bandwidth to meet all demands from clients. The elegant results in the unlimited capacity model-the access point and resellers charging a "fixed rate" at all times-no longer apply in the limited capacity case. Second, we extend the two-hop case of the unlimited capacity model in [3] to the multihop case and conclude that sparseness of nodes in a wireless mesh network results in low economic scalability of the network. Third, in view of the fixed-rate pricing strategy being nonoptimal when the network has a limited capacity, we propose a more practical charging policy, that is, the "fixed rate noninterrupted service," for wireless Internet access. Under this policy, we use the policy-iteration method from Markovian decision theory to devise the optimal pricing strategy of the access point. The algorithm is made applicable to both the one-hop case and the multihop case of the limited capacity model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we discuss background and related results in [3] . In Section 3, we study the unlimited capacity model with explicit client utility distributions in its one-hop case and, then, we extend it to the multihop case by proposing an equilibrium strategy profile and analyze its scaling issue. In Section 4, we investigate the limited capacity model, which shows that the previous equilibrium no longer holds and, then, we present the fixed-rate noninterrupted service model and devise the optimal pricing strategy of the access point by using the Markovian decision theory. We finish the section with an analysis of the multihop case and some observations on the network scaling issue of the limited capacity model. Section 5 concludes.
RELATED WORK AND BACKGROUND
Pricing in computer networks has been receiving much attention from the community recently. Research efforts have first been made on pricing in wired networks and then in wireless hotspot networks, wireless ad hoc networks, and wireless mesh networks. Our work differs from existing works mainly in two ways. First, our paper focuses on multihop wireless mesh networks and investigates whether general pricing mechanisms are effective to provide incentives to build such networks in a scalable fashion. Second, so as to answer the first question, we model the utility of all wireless nodes and allow the theoretically largest action space in the pricing game. Each selfish node will then maximize its own utility in the game and the resulting pricing equilibrium is studied to give insights into the practical design of public wireless mesh networks, which exploit pricing as an incentive system.
Pricing in wired networks has been studied by MacKieMason and Varian [4] and Kelly et al. [5] . They investigate the use of pricing as a method for regulating network traffic in view of congestion and promoting network efficiency. In [6] , Paschalidis and Liu further prove that, in a network with many small users, static pricing is asymptotically optimal. In [7] , Campos-Náñ ez and Patek present, when the assumption of many small users does not hold, a computational procedure for optimal static pricing in response to real-time client arrivals and departures. In [8] , Viterbo and Chiasserini study a similar issue but place the problem scenario in a wireless network. In [9] , Jiang et al. present a distributed pricing scheme to eliminate anomaly when multiple overlays interact with each other.
A number of researchers have investigated pricing in wireless networks as a mechanism for promoting participation and cooperation in packet forwarding among wireless clients by using different modeling approaches and under different assumptions. Friedman and Parkes study a strategy-proof Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) fixed-rate pricing scheme for Wi-Fi and wireless ad hoc networks [10] . Chen et al. propose pricing mechanisms for different multihop network structures based on a demand-and-supply market model [11] . Anderegg and Eidenbenz develop a VCG routing protocol that achieves truthfulness from wireless clients and cost efficiency by assuming that a selfish relaying node will forward a packet if its cost of forwarding is covered [12] . Musacchio and Walrand show that fixed-rate pricing is optimal in a Wi-Fi network when users have a "Web browsing utility," under the assumption that the network has an unlimited capacity [3] . Zhong et al. propose a cooperationoptimal routing and forwarding protocol for wireless ad hoc networks which integrates the VCG mechanism and a cryptographic technique [13] . In [14] , Wang et al. present a multicast routing protocol for wireless networks without using the VCG mechanism. The protocol guarantees truthfulness from clients. In [15] , [16] , Ma et al. present an incentive mechanism and service differentiation policy so as to promote contribution in P2P networks.
The seminal work by Musacchio and Walrand [3] presents the economic behavior of wireless nodes under a specific network topology. In particular, they study "onehop" and "two-hop" wireless networks by using a gametheoretic approach and prove that "fixed-rate pricing" is optimal to the access point, given that clients have the socalled "Web browsing" utility function. The Web browsing utility function models, for a client browsing the Web, the utility of having Internet access: The utility grows proportionally with the time from which access is initially gained and it saturates when the client no longer intends to browse. 1 Note that the analysis adopted and the results proven are only valid under a strong assumption: The network has an unlimited capacity, that is, the channel capacity of the wireless network is unlimited and the access point has an unlimited uplink bandwidth to the Internet or the access point provides no bandwidth guarantee to clients, whereas clients value the connection service without considering the available bandwidth. This assumption allows the access point to admit infinitely many clients: The admission of one client has no influence on the admission of others. Thus, the access point's total profit can be maximized by separately maximizing its gain in each interaction with a client. In the one-hop case, a two-player game between the access point and a single client abstracts all details of the aggregated system, whereas, in the twohop case, a three-player game among the access point, a single relaying node, and a single client will do. Our work relaxes the unlimited capacity assumption and shows that fixed-rate pricing is no longer optimal to the access point. The model adopted in [3] is hereafter termed the unlimited capacity model. In the following, we first present the related results, which serve as the basis of our work.
Unlimited Capacity Model-One-Hop Case
The one-hop case of the unlimited capacity model describes a wireless network where all clients can reach the access point directly (that is, without the need for packet forwarding by other nodes). The dynamics among the access point and the numerous clients are captured by using a two-player game between the access point and a single client, as shown in Fig. 2 . Time is divided into discrete slots. At the beginning of each time slot t, the client requests connection service over the slot and the access point replies with a slot price p t . The client chooses either to accept the price and connect to the access point or to reject and leave. The game ends once the client rejects a slot price and the number of time slots during which the client connects is denoted by T . The client has a Web browsing utility function:
where is a discrete random variable representing the number of time slots during which the client intends to connect and browse the Web and U is a continuous random variable representing the client's utility of gaining Internet access in one time slot. The client knows its values of U and , whereas the access point's prior knowledge of them includes only their probability distributions, obtained, for example, from a market survey. Fig. 3 depicts one possible distribution of a client's per-slot utility U, which is a uniform distribution. At the end of the game, the client has a net payoff of F ðT ; Þ À P T t¼1 p t , whereas the access point has a profit of P T t¼1 p t . Musacchio and Walrand [3] prove that the following strategy is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) [17] :
. The client connects or remains connected in slot t if and only if t and p t U. . The access point charges a nondecreasing price sequence fp t g such that p t 2 arg max p pP ðU ! pÞ.
1. In [3] , Musacchio and Walrand also study another type of utility function, called the "file transfer" utility function. It models the case in which a client is downloading a file and must remain connected before the download is finished in order to earn any utility. The function is like a step function. As Musacchio and Walrand [3] point out, such a utility is uncommon today; since software for downloading or sharing large files often provides the "resume" function for broken download, we will not further the analysis of this utility in our work. Fig. 2 . Game modeling of the one-hop case with a slot price p t charged by the access point. Fig. 3 . A uniform distribution of a client's per-slot utility U, with the shaded area representing P ðU ! p Ã Þ, which is the expected proportion of connecting clients when the access point charges at price p Ã .
There are three points to be noted here. First, the client's strategy is named the "myopic strategy" for its sole dependence on the immediate slot price. Second, it is often the case that the access point charges a "constant" or fixed price sequence since the expression pP ðU ! pÞ is maximized by a single price p Ã for most distributions of U and the price p Ã does not vary over time slots. Third, the quantity P ðU ! p Ã Þ, as shaded in Fig. 3 for a uniform distribution of U, has a physical meaning of the expected proportion of clients who are willing to pay and connect to the access point at the PBE. This is because each instance of price negotiation between the access point and a client at the first time slot can be taken as a Bernoulli trial with a probability of P ðU ! p Ã Þ that the negotiation is a success. With n independent negotiations with n clients, the number of successes is a binomial random variable with an expected value of nP ðU ! p Ã Þ. Hence, the expected proportion of clients willing to pay and connect the access point is P ðU ! p Ã Þ.
Unlimited Capacity Model-Two-Hop Case
The two-hop case describes the situation when a client is incapable of reaching the access point directly but has to route its traffic through an intermediate wireless node, referred to as the reseller. The game now involves three players, with the additional reseller, as shown in Fig. 4 . At the beginning of each time slot t, the client requests service from the reseller. The reseller, in turn, requests service from the access point, which replies with a slot price c t . Based on c t , the reseller decides how much to charge and sends a slot price p t to the client. The client chooses whether to accept or reject the price. If the client accepts p t , the reseller replies "accept" to the access point and vice versa. When the game ends, resulting from the first rejection of a slot price by the client, the net payoff of the client is F ðT ; Þ À P T t¼1 p t , whereas the reseller and the access point have profit of P T t¼1 ðp t À c t Þ and P T t¼1 c t , respectively. Musacchio and Walrand [3] prove that the following strategy profile is a PBE:
. As in the one-hop case, it is common for the access point and the reseller to adopt a fixed-price strategy since most distributions of U yield single maximizers of ðp À cÞP ðU ! pÞ and cP ðU ! p Ã ðcÞÞ, respectively.
The most important result in [3] is the proof of the natural selection of the fixed-rate pricing strategy by the access point and the reseller, without the need for contract enforcement. Fixed-rate pricing is appealing to customers for its simple charging scheme, whereas the exclusion of contract enforcement allows the service mechanism to be on a pure peer-to-peer basis and, hence, scalable. However, as we are going to show in Section 4, this result only applies to the following special situations:
. The wireless network channel and the access point's uplink have an unlimited capacity or have a sufficient capacity to meet all demands. . The network has a limited capacity, but the access point does not provide bandwidth guarantee to clients, whereas clients' valuations of the service are independent of its quality. Clearly, the first condition is not always true, whereas the second condition may not be realistic. For networks where the above conditions do not hold, the pricing and purchasing strategies remain to be investigated.
Remark. It is shown in [3] that, in a one-hop or two-hop wireless mesh network in which the network has an unlimited capacity, clients will be charged at a fixed rate by the access point or relaying wireless nodes.
EXTENSIONS TO THE UNLIMITED CAPACITY MODEL
The game-theoretic modeling in [3] provides a useful methodology for analyzing the pricing dynamics in a wireless mesh network-one in which either the network has an unlimited capacity or clients do not differentiate services of different bandwidths but only require an Internet access. In this section, we provide a methodology that offers a more comprehensive analysis. We first examine the game PBE in its one-hop case, with various probability distributions of the client's per-slot utility U, followed by a natural extension of the analysis into the multihop case. We then discuss some important network scaling issues in the economic perspective of such a network.
Optimal Pricing for the One-Hop Case under Various Utility Distributions
In [3] , Musacchio and Walrand provide generalized PBEs, which are applicable for any arbitrary distribution of a client's per-slot utility U, for both the one-hop and two-hop cases.
It would be helpful to analyze the one-hop-case PBE with some sample utility distributions before moving on to the more sophisticated multihop case. In the following, we study the one-hop-case PBE with the uniform utility distribution, for its mathematical tractability to obtain closed-form results, and the normal utility distribution, 2 for its realistic representation of a real-world market. In particular, we are interested in obtaining p Ã , the optimal price per slot, with which the access point maximizes pP ðU ! pÞ, as well as the quantity P ðU ! p Ã Þ, which physically represents the proportion of clients who are 2. When we use the normal utility distribution, the "tail" of the probability density function which falls in the negative region is not truncated. A client having a negative utility physically represents, for example, a user who is not interested in browsing the Web and the access service implies a cost to it, such as the cost of battery usage. willing to pay the price p Ã so as to obtain the wireless connection.
Consider the case where the client's per-slot utility U has a uniform distribution on the interval ½a; b, with a b. Any price lower than a would be accepted by a client, so the access point can set a price at a, which outperforms all such prices. Any price higher than b would be rejected by a client; hence, a price higher than b yields zero expected payoff. Thus, we are sure that the optimal price for the access point lies on the interval ½a; b. With this assumption, we may write
Differentiating (1) with p and equating it to zero yield the unique PBE price p Ã set by the access point:
The price sequence fp t g is, hence, a fixed sequence, with p t ¼ p Ã for all time slots ts. At the PBE price p Ã , the proportion of connecting clients is
The closed-form results can be confirmed with the numerical examples in Fig. 5a and Table 1 , which test four uniform distributions of U on the intervals [2, 10] , [4, 10] , [6, 10] , and [5, 11] , respectively. Fig. 5a plots the function pP ðU ! pÞ, or the expected profit per slot for the access point, against p for the four different distributions. It can be observed that each curve is composed of three parts: 1) On the interval ½0; a, the function grows linearly with p since a price below a will definitely be accepted by a client, 2) on ½a; b, the curve has a single maximization point at which p Ã is located, and 3) on ½b; 1, the function has zero value since no client will be willing to pay a price higher than b. Except for the third distribution, uniform on [6, 10] , all distributions have a b=2 and p Ã at b=2, which are classified as normal cases. The remaining distribution has p Ã at a, contributing the boundary case as p Ã is at the boundary of ½a; b. When the utility U has a normal distribution, closedform results are no longer tractable and one has to resort to numerical analysis. Four different normal distributions are used and the results are illustrated in Fig. 5b and Table 1 . The curves again possess the three-part characteristic, as discussed above, but there are no discrete boundaries between the composing parts due to the smoothness of the cumulative density function of normal distribution. Note that the maximizing price p Ã is still unique in this case.
Optimal Pricing for a Multihop Wireless Network
We now extend the unlimited capacity analysis into the multihop case, which is derived naturally from the two-hop case in [3] . The multihop case describes pricing dynamics in a multihop wireless network, where a client is at an arbitrary number of hops away from the access point. We first define the model and some notations, then propose a game PBE, and follow it by examples under various distributions of the client's per-slot utility. Results in this section also contribute to the solution to the multihop case under the limited capacity model later in Section 4.2. The multihop case allows clients to be arbitrarily n-hop away from the access point. Due to the unlimited capacity assumption, we can abstract the aggregated system to a game involving all nodes on the path from a client to the access point. The game involves n þ 1 players: the access point, n À 1 resellers, and the client, as shown in Fig. 6 . The resellers are indexed from the client side to the access point side by 1 to n À 1, whereas the access point is indexed by n. Procedures for price negotiation are analogous to that in the two-hop case: At each time slot t, access point n charges reseller n À 1 a price p n t , who, in turn, charges reseller n À 2 a price p nÀ1 t , and so on. In the 
The function m i ðp i Þ represents the price received by the client after the price p i set by node i is marked up by all of its downstream resellers. It can be proven that the above strategy profile is indeed a PBE. The proof follows naturally from the proof of the two-hop-case PBE in [3] . Due to the page limits, we refer readers to our technical report [18] for the complete derivation.
To see how the PBE of the game in the multihop case works, let us consider examples in which the client's per-slot utility U is uniformly and normally distributed. At the PBE of each of the following examples, the expression p n P ðU ! m n ðp n ÞÞ is maximized by a single p n and ðp i À p iþ1 ÞP ðU ! m i ðp i ÞÞ is maximized by a single p i for all i 2 f1; . . . ; n À 1g. For convenience, we use the notation p i Ã to denote the maximizing price of node i for all i 2 f1; . . . ; ng. At the PBE, the price sequence fp i t g of each node i is fixed at p i t ¼ p i Ã for all time slots ts. Generally speaking, evaluation of p i Ã for each node i involves a recursive iteration process. In the special case that U is uniformly distributed, one can obtain a closed-form solution of p i Ã for each node i.
Let us first consider the case that U is a uniform distribution. Theorem 1. In the multihop case of the unlimited capacity model, when U is uniformly distributed on the interval ½a; b, with a b, access point n will charge reseller n À 1 at p nÃ ¼ b=2 at the PBE, which is independent of the path length n toward the client, given that the "normal case" condition ð2 nÀ1 Þa À ð2 nÀ1 À 1Þb b=2 is satisfied. 
Differentiating (5) has no stationary point on the interval ½a; b and, hence, the maximum point is at the boundary and must be at a. We modify the optimal price of reseller 1 as follows:
Now, we look at reseller 2. Reseller 1 will charge at a if the condition ðp 2 þ bÞ=2 < a is satisfied. This condition can be rewritten as p 2 < 2a À b and, hence, we see that reseller 2 should not pick any price lower than 2a À b as reseller 1 will charge the client at price a anyway. In a similar fashion, as we analyze reseller 1, we assume reseller 2's optimal price p Hence, we write
Adopting the previous optimization technique, we have p
and, as we do to p 1 Ã , we need to modify the optimal price of reseller 2 to
We can iterate this process upstream through the numerous resellers. If, for node i, every downstream reseller j adopts the price markup strategy p j Ã ¼ ðp jþ1 þ bÞ=2, we can express
Note that this result also holds for access point n. One can find that, for every reseller i, i 2 f1; . . . ; n À 1g. In 
we may write 
A case satisfying the condition ð2 nÀ1 Þa À ð2 nÀ1 À 1Þb
b=2 is classified as a normal case; else, this is a boundary case. The boundary case corresponds to one in which reseller 1 charges the client a fixed price p 1 Ã ¼ a at the boundary of the interval ½a; b. It can be observed from (6) that, in normal cases, access point n always charges a fixed price b=2, independent of n, which is the path length toward the client. t u
The above results can be confirmed with the numerical examples depicted in Figs. 7 and 8. We define (6) and (7). For a client located n-hop away from the access point, the probability that it accepts the price p 1 Ã and connects is
Notice that, in a boundary case, the client always accepts the price. Another quantity of interest is the expected payoff of each node. The expected payoff of each node i can be compared through w i ðp i Ã Þ, which has a physical meaning of node i's expected profit at the first time slot. It can be expressed as upstream node always earns more than a downstream node does and the expected payoff of a node falls with increasing n, meaning that a node earns less when the client is farther away from the access point.
When U is normally distributed, one can analyze numerically to check if the economic properties still hold as when U is uniformly distributed. Figs. 7c, 8b, and 9b give associated graphical plots when U is normally distributed, with mean ¼ 5 and standard deviation ¼ 1:67. Notice that, in Fig. 8b , the curves for the different path length n no longer coincide. Fig. 9b shows that the previous claims about the expected payoff of nodes still hold in this example.
The Issue on Network Scaling
In the previous section, we present the analysis of pricing dynamics in the multihop case when uniform and normal distributions of U are assumed. Here, we investigate the scalability issue of the described multihop wireless network. By scalability, we mean the ability of pricing as an incentive system to encourage nodes to participate and grow the mesh network in a multihop fashion. The quantities concerned are the probability that a client, at an arbitrary distance, accepts its access price and connects the network and also the population distribution of clients. Let n e be the radius (in terms of the number of hops) of the effective multihop wireless network established by the access point such that a client located more than n e hops away from the access point will connect with a probability less than a threshold H. In the case where U is uniformly distributed, from (8) , n e can be derived as
For example, with U uniformly distributed on [0, 10], a threshold of H ¼ 0:5 yields n e ¼ 1, whereas H ¼ 0:1 yields n e ¼ 3. The former case says that the probability of a successful connection will fall below half for clients at more than one hop away, whereas the latter says that the probability even falls below 10 percent for clients at more than three hops away. This small effective network radius is not surprising as (8) reveals that the probability that a client connects to the network decreases exponentially with path length n unless the condition for a boundary case is satisfied. Note that the boundary case condition can be rewritten as n ! log 2 ðb=ðb À aÞÞ. Thus, when a is close to b, which means that the access point and resellers are relatively sure about the client's per-slot utility, the effective network radius is large. In Fig. 10 , we show the probability that a client is willing to connect ðP ðU ! p 1 Ã ÞÞ against a different n which is the length of the network path. In the figure, one can observe that a similar conclusion can be drawn when U is normally distributed. Though the probability that a client which is n-hop away from the access point and is willing to connect to the network decreases with increasing n, should the access point and resellers think that they can still make a profit with distant clients since a larger value of n implies larger coverage of potential clients? One can show that this argument is not true. Consider a simple client population model in which clients are evenly populated geographically, the arrival rate of clients in a particular region is proportional to its area, and the wireless signal results in a mesh network, where clients at different hop distances locate in areas formed by concentric circular boundaries, with the access point at the center. The following expression approximates the arrival rate of clients, which are n-hop away the access point and accept price p 1 Ã when U is uniformly distributed and constitutes a normal case:
where is the arrival rate of clients per unit area. The connection rate as a function of hop distance LðnÞ tends to 0 as n approaches infinity, hence showing that the intuition is incorrect.
The poor scaling performance of the pricing mechanism is related to the tree-like topology of the network under analysis. The multihop case of the unlimited capacity model describes a situation in which the client has a single route toward the access point. This constitutes a monopoly market between each node on the path and its downstream hop. The monopoly market gives each upstream node the price setting ability to maximize its profit and this introduces economic inefficiency. With pricing competition, economic scalability improves. Consider the network in Fig. 11a . The client has two paths toward the access point. Resellers A and B are under pricing competition against each other. A brief look at the case shows that the two resellers will lower their prices for the client until their costs to provide the connection service are reached, which are identical and equal to the price that the access point charges them. Thus, the access point effectively sees the client as a first-hop client and the client enjoys a price that is reduced to the normal first-hop price. The pricing structure of this network can be obtained by a simple extension of the onehop case in a tree-like network. The network in Fig. 11b shows similar properties. All resellers except the central one are under pricing competition. Only the central reseller has an opportunity to mark up the price from her upstream. The access point thus effectively sees the client as a secondhop client and the client enjoys a reduced price. This network degenerates to the two-hop case in a tree-like network. Similar arguments can be applied to the case in which a client which is n-hop away has more than one path to the access point. The important lesson of the above analysis is that the economic scalability of a wireless mesh network is linked with the density of nodes. Sparseness introduces a large number of monopolized links in clients' selectable paths to the access point, resulting in low economic scalability, whereas denseness introduces pricing competitions among nodes, apparently resulting in higher economic scalability. Moreover, our results in the pricing structure in tree-like networks may serve as building blocks for the general pricing structure in networks of other topologies. In particular, nodes under pricing competition may not have an opportunity to mark up the price from the upstream. After taking out those nodes, the pricing structure may resemble that in a treelike network. Pricing and scaling for networks with pricing competition involved remain as our future work.
Remark. In a multihop wireless mesh network in which the network has an unlimited capacity, clients will be charged at a fixed rate. However, if the network is sparse and each client has only one single route to the access point, the access price will not be affordable to most distant clients. It is concluded that the sparseness of nodes in a wireless mesh network reduces its economic scalability.
LIMITED CAPACITY MODEL
The formulation of the unlimited capacity model relies on the assumption that the wireless network channel and the access point's uplink have an unlimited capacity or the access point provides no bandwidth guarantee to clients. In this section, we consider a more realistic scenario and inspect the pricing and purchasing strategies of nodes in wireless networks with a limited network capacity. Similarly to the previous section, we begin with a one-hop network and show why the previous one-hop-case PBE is not applicable under this new setting. A substitute for the access service provision model named "fixed-rate noninterrupted service" is hence proposed and we provide an algorithm to obtain the optimal strategy of the access point in its defined strategy space. The analysis is finished with an extension to the multihop case and some observations on the network scaling issue of networks with a limited capacity.
One-Hop Case
Here, we first present the necessary modifications to the original unlimited capacity model and transform it into the limited capacity version. The one-hop case of the limited capacity model still describes a wireless network consisting of an access point plus clients who reach the access point directly. The distinction between the two models is that the wireless network and the access point's uplink here have a limited capacity and the access point has to assure the clients that they will have a certain amount of dedicated bandwidth, which is the premise of clients having the bandwidth-independent Web browsing utility function. This imposes the access point a bandwidth constraint on its profit maximization problem. Fig. 12 depicts this scenario. In our model, we limit the access point to admit at most m > 0 clients at a time. The capacity m is a design knob of the access point. It has to stochastically evaluate the bandwidth demand of clients and the effect of multiplexing clients' traffic so as to set the right m to provide to clients the bandwidth guarantee. Any client which arrives at the access point and is not immediately served due to this capacity limit will be dropped. Another addition to the original model is an explicit client-arrival process at the access point. This is necessary, as the interactions between the access point and a client are now complicated by the removal of the unlimited capacity assumption: They cannot be summarized by one simple two-player game and the access point must decide its strategy on each occasion based on its system condition at the time, such as the remaining capacity for admission. We model the client-arrival behavior by using a Poisson input process with a finite population of clients. Each client arrives with a rate at the access point and there are a total of M clients in the population.
The last modification to the unlimited capacity model is to transform it from a discrete-slot process into a continuous-time process so as to ease our analysis when matched with the client-arrival model. In the continuoustime version, the access point charges a particular client a price per unit time, or rate, pðtÞ at time t. The variables T , , and U are converted in the continuous-time sense to represent the amount of time that the client connects, the amount of time that the client intends to connect, and the client's utility of the service per unit time, respectively. The continuous-time Web browsing utility function of the client thus remains the same as its previous form F ðT ; Þ ¼ U Á minðT ; Þ. The access point still only knows the probability distributions of U and . Here, we further assume that the access point takes to be exponentially distributed, with mean 1=.
3 Our formulation of the limited capacity model is now complete. The correspondence between our model and the classical M/M/m/m/M queuing system [19] should be clear.
Let us give a simple scenario to show that, under the limited capacity model, the access point, on some occasions, will choose either to charge clients with a variable rate or to deliberately disconnect clients rather than to adopt a fixedrate noninterrupting strategy for the one-hop-case PBE with the unlimited capacity model proposed in [3] . Lemma 1. A fixed-rate noninterrupting strategy is not at all time optimal to the access point under the limited capacity model.
Proof. Consider the case where a new client arrives at the access point when it is at its full capacity. Let p 0 be the price that one of the m connected clients is paying. The access point may announce a price p 0 0 > p 0 to the new client. If the new client accepts, the access point's best response is to disconnect the old client paying p 0 and admit the new one unless the old client accepts a raise in price from p 0 to p 0 0 . Thus, a fixed-rate noninterrupting strategy is not the best response of the access point. t u Although the access point wishes to cease service to clients or increase the price over time to obtain higher profit, it is reasonable to believe that clients will be discouraged from buying such a kind of service since it is unrealistic to require clients to monitor the varying price continuously. Thus, we investigate a service model named "fixed-rate noninterrupted service," which is more likely to be adopted in practice.
The fixed-rate noninterrupted service model requires a contract to be enforced between the access point and a particular client as follows:
. The access point provides connection service to the client until the client voluntarily disconnects. . The client pays a fixed rate p for the service. The total payment is p times the duration of the service. Note that the access point is still allowed to announce different "fixed rates" (or prices) to different clients under this scheme, but, once announced, this fixed rate cannot be changed during the course of service for a particular client.
The fixed-rate noninterrupted service contract can be enforced in numerous ways. A common approach is to establish a third-party contract enforcement agent in the system. Clients will report to the enforcement agent on misbehavior of the access point, seeking the offender to be punished. The penalty is to be set heavy enough such that the access point will not go for any short-term benefit of disconnecting clients or raising their rates. Another approach is to distribute standardized software to nodes participating in the wireless mesh network, which conforms with the service contract. The owner of the access point will not have the knowledge to tweak the software so as to avoid contract enforcement, just as most Internet users will not change the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) in their operating systems so as to obtain a higher throughput.
Compared to the pricing model in [3] , the fixed-rate noninterrupted service model has the disadvantage that it requires contract enforcement, that is, it is not selfenforcing. There are a wide variety of pricing models that are not self-enforcing. Among them, we pick and investigate the fixed-rate noninterrupted service model for two reasons. First, the fixed-rate noninterrupted service model is driven by the fair expectation of customers on Internet access service and is one in its category that deviates the least from the original self-enforcing pricing model. This implies that there will be minimal incentives for the access point to break the service contract and use a floating rate which is against the will of customers. For comparison, consider a pricing model in a multihop network, which requires that the revenue be split evenly among the access point and the relaying nodes. In such a model, it is tempting for the nodes to break the contract for a higher profit as how the revenue is shared has nothing to do with customer satisfaction. To enforce this contract, the overhead will be high, whereas, for the fixed-rate noninterrupted service model, it is not. Second, the slight deviation of the fixed-rate noninterrupted service model from the original version also means that it is a harder problem to solve in comparison with those that put even more restrictions on the pricing scheme, such as requiring a common fixed rate to all clients. With the methodology for analyzing the fixed-rate noninterrupted service model, we can also solve simpler problem instances by using the same approach.
A strategy of the access point under the fixed-rate noninterrupted service model involves setting the charging rate to clients who want to be connected. The access point can make her decision based on a single parameter, namely, the number of connected clients in the system. Adopting queuing system notations, the number of connected clients in the system is represented by the current "state." For the M/M/m/m/M queuing system, it has m þ 1 states, from state 0 to state m. At state k, for all k 2 f0; . . . ; m À 1g, the access point has to decide the rate p k to charge the next "tobe-admitted" client. No decision has to be made at state m as the access point is at its full capacity. Thus, a policy of the access point is completely characterized by the price or rate vectorp ¼ ðp 0 ; p 1 ; . . . ; p mÀ1 Þ.
With the fixed-rate noninterrupted service contract, we see that clients will play the following strategy to maximize her payoff: 1) Connect the access point if and only if U ! p and 2) disconnect from the access point at time t ¼ with the assumption that clients with U ! p, utility per unit time not less than the charged rate, will not deliberately reject the first presented rate and wait until she receives a lower rate at a later time when the access point is less congested. Also, for clients rejecting the first presented rate, our Poisson client-arrival process may not accurately model their possible behavior of reprobing the access rate afterward.
We now derive an expression of the expected profit per unit time, or the gain, of the access point in the long run as a function of the rate vectorp. The general equilibrium solution for birth-death queuing systems [19] is employed. Note that a transition from state k to state k þ 1 for all k 2 f0; . . . ; m À 1g requires not only an arrival of a client but also her willingness to accept the charged price p k ; therefore, the "arrival rate" of our model is different from that of the conventional M/M/m/m/M queuing system by a factor of P ðU ! p k Þ for each state k, k 2 f0; . . . ; m À 1g. The transition rates of our model are
With k denoting the limiting probability that the system is in state k for all k 2 f0; . . . ; mg, we have
where the empty product is unity by convention. For simplification, consider that the access point earns an expected profit of p k = immediately when a client connects at state k. 4 Hence, the gain of the access point is
The optimal policy of the access point can be obtained by maximizing (9) over the rate vectorp. However, using classical optimization techniques to derive a closed-form solution of the optimal policy requires solving simultaneous nonlinear equations, which is complicated. Instead, we use the policy-iteration method in the Markovian decision theory [20] to determine the pricing for the above optimization problem.
The policy-iteration method is given in Algorithm 2. It involves an iteration cycle of two parts: the policy-improvement routine and the value-determination operation. It uses the notation g to denote the gain of the system and introduces a set of relative values v k for all k 2 f0; 1; . . . ; mg, which has the physical meaning that v i À v j is the increase in the gain caused by starting the system in state i rather than in state j. The algorithm is started in the policy-improvement routine, with all of the relative values v k set to 0.
The policy-improvement routine improves the current policy by considering alternatives in each state based on the relative values v k , which are either set to 0 initially or obtained in the value-determination operation for the current policyp. It requires solving a separable optimization problem, where the design variables are p 0 ; p 1 ; . . . ; p mÀ1 , as shown in Algorithm 2. The solution to this optimization then forms a new policy. If the difference between this new policy and the previous policy in the iteration cycle is smaller than a predefined threshold, the iteration process has converged and the (near) optimal policy is found. Otherwise, the algorithm goes into the value-determination operation and the new policy is evaluated. who want to receive the connection service. We fix the departure rate of client to 1 and vary the arrival rate from 0.2 to 10. Fig. 13 shows the results. It can be observed that the state-dependent price rises with the number of clients in the access point system: p i ! p j for all i > j. This agrees with the economic sense that, when the remaining resource or supply of service decreases, the price increases. Also, the state-dependent price rises with increasing and this is logical as the arrival rate represents demand. Fig. 14 gives the probability that a client is willing to accept the offered price and connects to the system. It is given by the following expression:
The setting is the same as in the previous case except that we repeat with different client populations, setting M to 5, 10, and 15. We see that the probability drops with the arrival rate. In addition, its value is always lower for a larger population. The result agrees with the intuition that, with higher demand for the service, the probability of a successful purchase drops. Last, we find in our experiments that the policy-iteration method takes, on average, four iterations to converge to the optimal pricing policy for various problem sizes m (the number of state prices to be determined) from 1 to 100. The convergence condition is that policies in two consecutive iterations differ by less than 0.001 for every state price. A detailed evaluation is documented in our technical report [18] . The algorithm proves to be efficient in our access point profit maximization problem.
Multihop Case
We now extend the limited capacity model to the multihop case. We make the assumption that the bandwidth bottleneck is at the wireless channel one-hop around the access point or at the access point's uplink to the Internet, where traffic from all clients in the wireless mesh network merges. Hence, any reseller who has purchased Internet access service from it upstream will have adequate bandwidth for it downstream. This situation is depicted in Fig. 15 . In comparison with the multihop case in the unlimited capacity model, we see that the bandwidth constraint only affects the access point. For the resellers, their strategies only depend on the prices that their respective upstream hops charge them. Thus, any node apart from the access point will follow its strategy in the unlimited capacity model here.
The focus of the multihop case is to devise the optimal pricing strategy of the access point, which involves determining the respective optimal prices for clients from different distances at each state. Thus, for an access point with capacity m and with the assumption that the most distant clients arriving at the access point are from n hops away, a policy of the access point can be characterized by the price matrix P ¼ ½p ki , k 2 f0; . . . ; m À 1g, i 2 f1; . . . ; ng, in which p ki represents the price at state k for a client which is i-hop away.
To ease the analysis, we modify the client-arrival process by removing the feature of finite client population. This is necessary as an arrival process with finite population requires keeping track of the numbers of admitted clients at different distances, which highly complicates state information. We roll back to an arrival model that originated in the M/M/m/m queuing system [19] . Assuming that the most distant clients arrive from a distance of n hops, we use an arrival rate vector ¼ ð 1 ; 2 ; . . . ; n Þ to denote the arrival rates of clients from different distances in which i denotes the arrival rate of clients who are i-hop away. With denoting the departure rate of a client in the system, we have the following state-transition rates:
The factor moderating i , which is the pure arrival rate of clients which are i-hop away, is now P ðU ! m i ðp ki ÞÞ, which is a simple reflection from the multihop case in the unlimited capacity model that any state rate p ki charged by the access point will be marked up by all i À 1 downstream resellers, as expressed by the function m i ðp ki Þ in (4). Further taking the simplification that the access point earns an expected profit of p ki = immediately when a client which is i-hop away connects at state k, 5 we can again use the policy-iteration method to solve for the optimal pricing policy of the access point, but with the following changes:
The set of equations to be solved in the value-determination operation is updated as 5. This simplification is again an approximation technique to reduce the state space as in the one-hop case. One can observe that, when U has a uniform distribution, optimal prices for clients at different distances are the same for each state.
The following shows some numerical results of the multihop case obtained by using the policy-iteration method. Fig. 16 essentially plots the resulting optimal price matrices for two cases. The first case has the client's utility rate U uniformly distributed on [0, 10], whereas the second case has U normally distributed, with a mean of 5 and a standard deviation of 1.67. For both cases, the arrival rate vector is (4, 2, 1), the departure rate is 1, and the capacity of the access point m is 5. It can be shown that, when U is uniformly distributed, the optimal prices for clients at different distances at each state are identical, whereas, when U is normally distributed, the access point tends to charge a lower price for clients who are farther away. As in the one-hop case, prices rise with the number of admitted clients.
When U is normally distributed, prices for distant clients are lower than prices for clients closer to the access point; however, the prices tend to converge when the arrival rate of proximate clients increases. This is illustrated in Fig. 17 . The arrival rate of first-hop clients increases from 1 to 90. The remaining clients are from two hops away and arrive with a rate of 10. Departure rate is fixed at 1. The access point has a capacity m of 5. U is normally distributed, with a mean of 5 and a standard deviation of 1.67. It can be observed that prices for first-hop and second-hop clients at state 4 converge with increasing 1 .
Scalability of Networks with a Limited Capacity
In the limited capacity model, we derive the optimal pricing policy of the access point by using the policy-iteration method, which provides numerical results but not closedform state prices. Though the lack of closed-form results hinders us from analytically deducing the scalability of networks with a limited capacity, we can observe that, when the access point has a capacity constraint to fulfill, the access (state) prices that it sets are always higher than those when it has an unlimited capacity. In short, as the network capacity increases, the state prices that the access point sets decrease and approach the flat rate in a network with an unlimited capacity. Hence, we can conclude that the scalability of a network with a limited capacity is upper bounded by the scalability of a network of the same topology but with an unlimited capacity.
Remark. In a wireless mesh network with a limited capacity, clients will not be charged at a fixed rate without contract enforcement. With the "fixed-rate noninterrupted service" contract, the access point will charge according to the amount of remaining network capacity. The "state price" can be obtained by the efficient policy-iteration method and is found that it grows with a decrease in remaining admission quota. The scalability of a network with a limited capacity is always lower than that of a network of the same topology but with an unlimited capacity.
CONCLUSION
We have conducted a mathematical analysis of the economic behavior of nodes in a wireless mesh network when they are making a decision to establish an Internet connection service. Two scenarios are investigated: either the network has an unlimited or it has a limited channel capacity. First, we present specific examples of the one-hop case of the unlimited capacity model, with various distributions of a client's perslot utility. We then extend the analysis to the multihop case and show that the price of the access service grows quickly as the service path length increases. The implication is that it becomes unaffordable for distant clients (that is, many hops away from the access point) and the wireless mesh network may not be economically scalable. In the limited capacity case, we have proven that a fixed-rate pricing scheme similar to the one proposed in [3] is not optimal or economically beneficial to the access point. We further investigate a more practical "fixed-rate noninterrupted service" model for charging. To determine the optimal price for this charging scheme, we model the problem as a Markovian decision process and use the efficient policy-iteration method to solve for the optimal pricing strategy of the access point. Numerical results show that the state price follows with supply and demand and the economic scalability of a network with a limited capacity is lower than one with an unlimited capacity.
